The FBI's legal collision with Apple regarding getting data out of an encrypted iPhone curiously occurred for the first time in a case where the owner (Syed Rizwan Farook, technically not the owner but the person who knew its password) of the iPhone was (shot) dead, and not in a case of a living prisoner or arrestee stoically refusing to divulge the password or PIN.
Does this mean that, until now, whenever the FBI wanted to know the contents of an encrypted iPhone, it has always been able to coerce the password out of a living person, perhaps through harsh or devious interrogation? Exactly what techniques do law enforcement agencies use to coerce revealing a password? Just how effective, quantitatively, is their rubber-hose cryptanalysis? It is frightening if the answer is "nearly 100%".
Alternatively, maybe this was the first time the FBI thought it could win such a legal case, riding on anti-Muslim public opinion and TERRORISM TERRORISM TERRORISM, hoping Apple would comply without a fight.
No comments :
Post a Comment