[ghtkdpuc] Surveillance of surveillance

Country A does military surveillance on Country B.  Country B does surveillance on Country A's discussion and analysis of B, including discussion of A's aforementioned surveillance of B.  And vice versa.

This might be better imagined as information willingly exchanged as part of a treaty, because if A's surveillance of B involves, say, a bug planted in B's headquarters, then B observing A discussing the information gathered from the bug will reveal to B the presence of the bug, causing B to remove the bug and destroy the information exchange.

The goal of this information exchange is to increase world peace, to decrease military actions.  A will attack B if A believes it will win.  Accurate surveillance can prevent a stupid attack caused by a mistaken belief of winning.  If A believes it can win by exploiting a weakness in B's defense, and B knows A is discussing this weakness, then B can move to shore up its weakness.  With the weakness eliminated, there is less incentive to attack.

Of course, all this is a radical change from the way military strategy is conducted nowadays (and historically): secrets and lies.  Perhaps more doable these days with improvements in surveillance and monitoring technologies.  And the incentive is there: warfare is a negative sum game; decreasing it is positive sum.

Game theoretically, it is a move toward more common knowledge, and a mechanism to induce more optimal actions.